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 न �दष्ठमभ्य�तक्रान्तंु शक्यं मत्य�न केन�चत ्। 
 �दषट्मेव कृतं मन्ये पौरुष ंतु �नररथ्कम ्।। 
 “No living creature can exceed his fate. 
 I believe that fate is set and human exertion is pointless.”1 
Mahābhārata V.40.30. 
1. Introduction 
If a self-driving car causes an accident, who is responsible for that? This question, which has long been a theme in 
scientific fiction, has become more real to us since we have witnessed such accidents in real life. Tesla’s fatal accidents 
in California in 2018 are fresh in our minds. It was reported that a vehicle involved in one of the crashes was in autopilot 
mode; however, based on the definition the “current autopilot features require active driver supervision and do not make 
the vehicle autonomous,”2 the vehicle was not 100% autonomous. Nevertheless, the impact of these incidents has been 
huge enough to make us contemplate the fact that an autonomous driving system is almost ready to market, which 
prompts us to think about the possible consequences of the involvement of fully-automated vehicles in fatal accidents in 
the near future. We realize that the point raised here is not at all a task for the future, but a very urgent issue in our society. 
The ongoing project “Consideration on the concept of ‘responsibility’ between autonomous machines and citizenries”3 
reflects full awareness of this pressing situation and thoroughly investigates the question “Who is responsible?” and, 
more fundamentally, “What is responsibility?” 
As some scholars have noted,4 philosophers in Indian tradition did not address the same topics or concepts as Western 
philosophers have addressed in their tradition. This is the case with the concept of responsibility. This does not mean, 
however, that Indian philosophers did not consider such topics or have such conceptions. Rather, we should say that they 
have viewed these topics and conceptions from different perspectives. 
In light of this argument, we start with the question “Was there the concept of responsibility in Indian tradition?” We 
then move on to discuss “Is the concept of responsibility possible in Indian philosophy?” We deal with the concepts of 
volition (or desire) and decision (or will), which play an important role in the logical foundation of the concept of 
responsibility. Investigating how these concepts are applicable (or inapplicable) to Indian philosophical tradition is 
another key topic addressed in this paper. 
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2.1 The General Concept of Responsibility 
The term “responsibility” derives from the verbal notion “to respond” (Lat. respondēre), which means “answer to, 
promise in return.” The concept originally appeared in the field of legal relations and then developed into a topic of 
debate around the 19th century in Western philosophy. Its definition has been provided in various ways since then. These 
discussions often focus on how the concept of responsibility is related to (a) the agent of actions, (b) the free will of the 
agent, (c) the scope of responsibility, etc.  
Strawson’s definition, for example, is “To be capable of being truly or ultimately responsible for one’s actions is to 
be capable of being truly or ultimately deserving of praise and blame for them.”5 This definition is based on an archaic 
principle called “the principle of alternate possibilities,” which states that “A person is morally responsible for what he 
has done only if he could have done otherwise.”6 Frankfurt revised this principle to “A person is not morally responsible 
for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise.”7 According to this principle, one is 
held responsible for one’s actions only when one has an alternative choice and full control over one’s actions. This way 
of specifying the concept of responsibility is fairly familiar to us and conforms to our beliefs, as learned from experience. 
2.2 The Concept of Dharma in Indian Tradition 
In Sanskrit dictionaries, we cannot find any true equivalent for the term “responsibility”’ in this sense.8 The topic of 
discussion, on the other hand, reminds us of the concept “dharma” in Indian Tradition. Dharma is one of the most 
important moral codes and is usually described as “steadfast decree, statute, ordinance, law, usage, practice, customary 
observance or prescribed conduct, duty, right, justice, virtue, religion, religious merit, good works.” 9  Dharma is 
something that we are obligated to do. We are ordained by the scripture to perform such actions, so we are, in a sense, 
responsible for these actions. In an ancient text like Manusmṛti, it is said that the scripture Veda is the source of dharma: 
 
Manusmṛti II.6-9: The roof of the Law (dharma) is the entire Veda; the tradition and practice of those who know 
the Veda: the conduct of good people; and what is pleasing to oneself. Whatever Law Manu has proclaimed with 
respect to anyone, all that has been taught in the Veda, for it contains all knowledge. After subjecting all this to 
close scrutiny with the eye of knowledge, a learned man should apply himself to the Law proper to him on the 
authority of the scriptures; for by following the Law proclaimed in scripture and tradition, a man achieves fame in 
this world and unsurpassed happiness after death.10 (Olivelle 2005: 94) 
 
Traditionally, Veda is considered to be the source of knowledge. We should perform our own duties (svadharma) as 
prescribed in the Veda in order to attain our highest goal in this life or after death. The Jainimi Sūtra, the essential text 
of Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics, states that “Dharma is of the nature of an injunction (codanā).”11 An injunction is a sentence 
that urges a person to act. These injunctions are usually known from imperative sentences (vidhivākya). This raises the 
following question: If we know what we should do because we are informed by imperative sentences in the scriptures 
to act according to the injunctions, are we free to choose? The answer seems to be no.12 As the above quoted Manusmṛti 
definitely says, we have to apply ourselves to dharma on the authority of the scriptures (śrutiprāmāṇyataḥ). The authority 
also says that if we do not follow dharma, as prescribed by the injunctions, something undesirable will happen.13 It 
seems, therefore, that it is not easy to define what responsibility is in Indian tradition, especially in a way in which the 
concept of responsibility would conform to the principle of alternate possibilities. 
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2.3 Karma and Determinism 
There is another view that is particular to Indian tradition. The doctrine of karma, or the law of karma, is to be discussed 
in relation to the concepts of responsibility and free will. According to the law of karma, our actions are the consequences 
of what we have done in our past lives. In the same way, our present actions lead to inevitable consequences in the future. 
The precursor to this idea can be found in Upaniṣads,14 and it has become an established doctrine among traditional 
thinkers, except materialists (Cārvāka). We believe that we will act according to our will. Contrary to our experience, 
however, our actions are inevitably a part of this unavoidable causal relationship of karma. Some scholars suggest that 
“If we are justified in our acceptance of the causal dogma, there does not seem to be any legitimate way to avoid 
fatalism.”15 This argument that the doctrine of karma entails determinism reminds us of a similar discussion in Western 
thought, according to which there are two ways of interpreting so-called causal determinism:16 
 
- Determinism: Everything that happens, including our own actions, has already been causally determined to occur. 
- Indeterminism: Persons are free to choose and have full control over what they do and whether they do it. 
 
If we accept the law of karma, we assume the position of determinism. The actions we choose and whether we perform 
them have already been predetermined by the law of karma. In addition, if we consider the abovementioned Vedic 
injunction, we come to the deterministic view. We have no control over our own actions because they are prescribed by 
the Vedic injunctions. In this case, it is difficult to assume freedom or free will in the framework of the traditional Indian 
way of thinking.  
2.4 Compatible or Incompatible 
If we accept the idea that we are always coerced into an action by the law of karma or by scriptural injunctions, it brings 
about an assumption that we have no freedom at all in choosing our actions. This hypothesis is called incompatibilism, 
which explains that causal predetermination and the concept of freedom are incompatible.17 Although it may seem very 
natural to us, this hypothesis leads to some undesirable consequences. A skeptical thought arises regarding the value of 
our efforts; this adheres to the deterministic way of thinking. If “The future is already determined or established and we 
cannot change or prevent it,”18 what is the use of our effort? The concept of responsibility, which is intimately connected 
with free will and “the principle of alternate possibilities,” also does not go with determinism. If what we have done was 
predetermined, and we had no freedom to change or avoid it, are we really responsible for it? 
Ancient Indian thinkers do not take the stance of incompatibilism. Most of them accept that we live in saṃsāra 
(transmigrating lives). The idea that many lives in saṃsāra are tied successively by the causal chain would be regarded 
as a determinism. At the same time, they hold the view that people are able to cut this causal chain and transcend saṃsāra 
into a state of liberation by performing Vedic rituals, good deeds (puṇya), asceticism, etc., which are determined by our 
will. 
In Western thought, this position is called compatibilism, which asserts that our freedom to act is entirely compatible 
with our actions, which have, all along, been predetermined by forces outside our control. Freedom and causal 
determinism are consistent with each other.19 In Indian tradition, it is believed that determinism and our free will are 
compatible. Our will or volition could work with the causal chain and possibly affect the course of succession in saṃsāra. 
It is possible only under the compatibilism hypothesis to remove the abovementioned skepticism of the value of our will 
and efforts.  
 
40  The Concept of Responsibility in Indian Philosophical Tradition 
 
3.1 Icchā and prayatna 
English philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) interprets freedom as being compatible with causal determinism. 
According to Hobbes’s definition, freedom is unobstructed desire, and to act is simply based on our wanting to do 
something. He identifies action with voluntariness. We do something because we want to do it.20 A similar idea is found 
in the Indian tradition. Icchā (desire, wish) is an important factor, especially in Indian traditional soteriology. It is claimed 
that icchā causes prayatna (effort, volition). We do something because we have the desire for it and the volition to do it. 
Although everything in our world is predetermined by the law of karma, it is believed that our desire and volition to 
overcome this can break the causal chain of karma. 
For example, the Brahmasūtra, the basic scripture of the Vedānta philosophy, begins with the so-called jijñāsā sūtra: 
ata ato brahmajijñāsā (Then therefore the investigation into Brahman). The term “jijñāsā” is a noun derived from the 
desiderative of the verbal notion “jñā,” which means “desire to know.” Śaṅkara, one of the most famous Indian thinkers, 
further notes that “desire to know” is brought about by four prerequisite means.21 Of these four means, the most notable 
in this context is mumukṣutva (the desire to be liberated). Therefore, the basic idea of the means to liberation is 
characterized by “desire” in principle, without which we shall be subsumed in saṃsāra or the succession of the law of 
karma forever. 
The idea that our volition can open the closed circle of saṃsāra and break the chain of karma would guarantee the 
possibility and value of our efforts. We exert ourselves because we desire to do so. In this sense, Indian thinkers take the 
position of compatibilism. 
It is, however, a bit hasty to connect desire directly to actions. We know from experience that we do not always 
perform actions solely according to our desire. This is the difference between us and animals. Animals are driven to act 
simply according to their desires. Human actions are not that simple. We sometimes do not act as we desire, or we act 
against our desires. The decision might be an intermediate between desire and action. When we desire to do something, 
we decide to do it, or we avoid it. Unless we are self-determined, we do not do something even if we are commanded to 
do it by the scriptures or forced to do it by the law of karma. We do something (or not) according to our decision, whether 
it is good or bad, desirable or undesirable.22 In Indian tradition, we are also advised to do good (puṇya) and avoid doing 
bad (apuṇya). This decision would possibly affect consequences in the future. 
3.2 Decision and Responsibility 
Let us now address the question of how the concept of responsibility should be understood from the viewpoint of 
compatibilism. In Indian tradition, as seen above, thinkers accept the law of karma, and at the same time, they suppose 
that they can change the way that the 
law of karma will affect the future. 
Although our previous deeds may 
urge us to do something, we are able 
to decide whether to accept or reject 
it. The viewpoint of compatibilism 
enables us to assume that we are 
responsible for our actions because 
we have a decision to make 
regarding whether to perform an 
action or avoid it. This notion is a 
Fig. 1 
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close synonym for “the principle of alternate possibilities,” as discussed above. Once we admit the possibility that our 
decision is the intermediary by which we are able to act otherwise, we must also accept that we are responsible for what 
we have decided to do and what we have actually done. We have no freedom in the sense of doing things at will. However, 
we at least have our own decisions to do or avoid something. Therefore, we are partly predetermined and restricted in 
the freedom to choose. Due to this restricted freedom, we are fully responsible for our decisions. 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we have not dealt with the notion of agency, which is another important issue in the present discussion. 
The model shown in Fig. 1 postulates that the law of karma only affects the relationship between actions and accepting 
the actor’s consequences. This postulation is based on the basic principle represented in fundamental texts like 
Upaniṣads: “A man turns into something good by good action and into something bad by bad action.”23 In other words, 
the scope of the law of karma is limited within self-responsibility. This point needs to be discussed further in relation to 
the question of what the idea of “agency” in itself is, which has been very controversial in the history of Indian 
philosophy.24 Indian traditional thinkers typically argue about the self. They seem indifferent to what we do to others 
and what others do to us. This attitude, which might well be termed “a lack of social context,” is always problematic 
when we think about our contemporary issues through the lens of Indian philosophy. 
However, the definition of responsibility remains controversial. The basic idea that can be drawn in conclusion from 
what has been discussed above in relation to the concept of free will is whether we have, even if not fully, control over 
our own decision making. If we take the position that everything, even our own decisions, is predetermined, it would 
result that everything, including a variety of experiences in our lives, is meaningless; everything goes as it should. This 
idea does not seem natural and familiar. 
In Western tradition, the viewpoints regarding how things should really be in the hypothetical view of 
(non-)determinism are summarized as follows:25 
 
a. Things are causally predetermined, so they are uncontrolled. 
b. Things are causally undetermined and they are uncontrolled. (Randomness or mere chance) 
c. Things are causally undetermined and they are controlled. 
 
As shown above (Fig. 1), the possibility of our control, though limited, over our decisions in the Indian theory of 
saṃsāra, based on the law of karma, might not fall into any of these categories. Therefore, we have to add one more 
category to the list. 
 
d. Things are causally predetermined, but they are controlled. 
 
In other words, things are causally predetermined by the law of karma, but they are, or they should be, controlled by our 
decisions. Under this condition, breaking the chain of saṃsāra, which leads to the state of mokṣa, should be possible.  
In addition, only under this teleological supposition can the concept of responsibility be understood in a meaningful 
way. We are able to overcome saṃsāra merely because our desire, volition, decisions, or efforts are evaluated in a way 
in which they are compatible with causal determinism, and we have control over our decisions. 
 
42  The Concept of Responsibility in Indian Philosophical Tradition 
Texts and Abbreviations 
BhG  Bhagavadgītā. The Bhīṣmaparvan: being the sixth book of the Mahābhārata. Ed. S. K. 
Belvalkar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1947. 
Brahmasūtrabhāṣya.  Text with Tippaṇis. revised by Wāsudeo Laxmaṇ Shāstrī Paṇsīkar. Bombay: 
Nirṇayasāgar Press 1915. 
Mbh   Mahābhārata. The Śāntiparvan: being the twelfth book of the Mahābhārata. Vol. I-3. 
Ed. S. K. Belvalkar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. 1954. 
MW  Sanskrit English. Dictionary. Ed. Monier  Monier-Williams. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
1872. 
References 
Bareau 1955 André Bareau. “The Concept of Responsibility in Ancient Buddhism.” East and West 
(Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente) 6, pp. 216-223. 
Fischer & Ravizza 1998 J. M. Fischer and M. Ravizza. Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral 
Responsibility. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Frankfurt 1969 H. G. Frankfurt 1969 “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.” Journal of 
Philosophy 66, pp. 829-839. 
Garbutt 2008 K. Garbutt. Mahābhārata: Book Five. Preparation for War. Volume One. Translated by 
Kathleen Garbutt. The Clay Sanskrit Library. New York : New York University Press : 
JJC Foundation. 
Hill 1993 Peter Hill. “Individual Responsibility in the Mahābhārata.” South Asia: Journal of 
South Asian Studies 16/2, pp. 3-20. 
Hobbes 1651 Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes’s Leviathan: Reprinted from The Edition of 1651. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 1909. 
Kane 1977 Pandurang Vaman Kane. History of Dharmaśāstra. Vol. V, Pt. II. Poona: Bhandarkar 
Oriental Research Institute. 
Dasti & Bryant 2014 M. Dasti and E. F. Bryant. Free Will, Agency, and Selfhood in Indian Philosophy. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Meyers 2014  Karin Meyers, “Free Persons, Empty Selves.” In: Dasti & Bryant 2014, pp. 41-67. 
Mohanty 2017 J. N. Mohanty. “Dharma, Imperatives, and Tradition: Toward an Indian Theory of 
Moral Action.” In: Indian Ethics: Classical Traditions and Contemporary Challenges 
Vol. I. Eds. P. Bilimoria, J. Prabhu, and R. Sharma. London and New York: Routledge. 
Pink 2017   Thomas Pink. Free Will: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Olivelle 1998 Patrick Olivelle. The Early Upaniṣads: Annotated Text and Translation. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
Strawson 1986  Galen Strawson. Freedom and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Rep.  2010)  
Suryanarayanan 1940 S. S. Suryanarayanan. “Karma and Fatalism.” The Philosophical Quarterly (India) 16. 
Taylor 2006  C. C. W. Taylor. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Books II-IV. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Reichenbach 1990 Bruce R. Reichenbach. The Law of Karma: A Philosophical Study. Basingstoke: 
MacMillan. 
 
国際哲学研究 10 号 2021  43 
Notes 
* This work is supported by Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST)/Research Institute of Science and Technology 
for Society (RISTEX). This paper is revised version of the paper read at the International Conference of Indian Society 
for Indic Studies on Applied Ancient Wisdom, held at University of Delhi (New Delhi) in Feb. 2018.  
 I would like to express my gratitude to participants of the conference who ardently discussed the topic and brought up 
some important points. My thanks are also due to Dr. Kazuya Matsuura who generously read the draft of this paper and 
gave many useful comments. 
1. Garbutt 2008: 365. 
2. Accessed 20 Oct. 2020. <https://www.tesla.com/autopilot? redirect=no>. 
3. The project (PI: Dr. Kazuya Matsuura, period 2017-2021) has been undertaken in the research area of Human 
Information Technology Ecosystem (HITE). 
4. For example, in Mohanty’s (2017: 72) discussion about the concept of freedom: “One thing appears undeniable: the 
Hindu and the Buddhist philosophers did not have the tripartite faculty psychology so familiar in classical [W]estern 
thought. Volition was often a function of buddhi (intelligence), often of manas (mind) or antaḥkaraṇa (the inner 
sense). If the same concept of will was not available, the problem of freedom could not have been the same – also 
because the problem of freedom arose in [W]estern thinking in the context of the theological idea of divine 
omnipotence (and foreknowledge).” 
5. Strawson (1986: 1). 
6. Frankfurt (1969: 829). 
7. Frankfurt (1969: 838). 
8. In Sanskrit, the term “responsible” might well be translated to the term vaktavya, which a Sanskrit English dictionary 
registers as: “to be spoken or uttered, fit or proper to be said; to be named or called; to be spoken to or addressed; to be 
spoken about or against, having a bad name or reputation, blamable, reprehensible, vile, low, base, bad; liable to be 
called upon for an account, answerable, accountable, responsible; subject, dependent.” (MW, p. 877.) 
In the Mahābhārata, we see an example of the usage of this term “vaktavya:” 
 अकृत्वा कमर् यो लोके फल ं�वन्द�त �विष्टतः 
 स तु वक्तव्यतां या�त द्वेष्यो भव�त प्रायशः 
 “If anyone enjoys the fruits of action without doing it by himself, he is to be blamed and becomes disliked generally.” 
What we know from this example is that they share the idea that “responsibility” or the property “being blamed” is 
attributed to the agent. 
The concept of responsibility discussed in relation to the idea of “being blamed” is also presented in Aristotle’s 
Nicomachean Ethics Book II-III. Cf. Taylor 2006. 
9. MW, p. 449. 
10. Olivelle (2005: 404): 
 वेदोऽ�खलो धमर्मलूं स्म�ृतशीले च तद्�वदाम ्। आकारश्चैव साधूनामात्मनस्तुिष्टरेव च ॥६॥ 
 यः किश्कत्कस्य�कद्धम� मननुा प�रक��त र्तः । स सव� ऽ�भ�हतो वेदे सवर्�ानमयो �ह सः ॥७॥ 
 सव� तु समवे�येदं �न�खल ं�ानच�षुा । श्रु�तप्रामाण्यतो �वद्वान्स्वधम� �न�वशते वै ॥८॥ 
 श्रु�तस्मतृ्य�ुदत ंधमर्मनु�तष्ठिन्ह मानवः । इह क��त र्मवाप्नो�त पे्रत्य चानु�मं सुखम ्॥९॥ 
11. Jaiminisūtra I.1.2: चोदनाल�णोऽथ� धमर्ः 
 
 
44  The Concept of Responsibility in Indian Philosophical Tradition 
 
12. A similar discussion appears in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book III.1-5, where Aristotle maintains that “All and 
only involuntary acts are excusable.” (Taylor 2006: 168) 
13. BhG II.33-36: 
 “Or suppose you would not engage yourself in this battle based on Dharma, then you would give up your Dharma and 
honor and incur guilt. Everyone will talk about your disgrace forever. And for one who has been honored, disgrace is 
worse than death. Great warriors think that you have fled from the battle out of fear. And those who once esteemed you 
highly would disrespect you. Your enemy will tell what is improper to be said about you, accusing you of your 
inability. Is there anything more miserable than this?” 
 BhG II.33-36: 
 अथ चे�व�मम ंधम्य� संग्रामं न क�रष्य�स । ततः स्वधम� क��त� च �हत्वा पापमवाप्स्य�स ॥ 
 अक��त� चा�प भूता�न कथ�यष्यिन्त तेऽव्ययाम ्। संभा�वतस्य चाक��त र्मर्रणाद�त�रच्यते ॥ 
 भयाद्रणादपुरत ंमन्स्यंते त्वां महारथाः । येषां च त्वं बहुमतो भूत्वा यास्य�स लाघवम ्॥ 
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